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Coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, a preventable occupational and environmental disease com-monly referred to as black lung, was thought to be 
a moot issue after the enactment in 1969 of the Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act, which created sweeping health and 
safety reforms and was followed by a significant decline in 
black lung cases. However, the disease became resurgent 
in the United States in the early 2000s,1 and it is back in 
central Appalachia at unprecedented levels. Recently,  
20.6 percent of long-tenure miners (25-plus years) who 
were tested in Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia 
tested positive for black lung.2
This brief, based on interviews with miners, clinic 
workers, black lung attorneys, government employees, 
and lay advocates as well as a case-study analysis of two 
black lung clinics in southwest Virginia, describes how 
prevention failures in the coal mining industry have 
resulted in the resurgence of black lung.
The Horror of Black Lung
Caused by the chronic inhalation of coal and silica 
dust, black lung is progressive, incurable, life-altering, 
and fatal.3 One miner interviewed for this study 
described his experience as a “smothering sensation”: 
It’s almost like a sensation that you’re drowning on 
dry land. Especially when it progresses. You really 
never can catch enough breath, and over time it 
gets worse and worse, and so you’re sort of gasping 
for air. Even in a seated position—not moving, not 
exercising—you just can’t get enough air into your 
lungs. You can’t get enough oxygen into your blood. 
And then it just goes downhill until your body 
physically just can no longer survive with that little 
amount of oxygen and you die.4
Black lung slowly corrodes the quality of life of miners 
and their families until it eventually leads to death: “I’m 
aggravated that I can’t do things. It’s just there all the time.” 
Failed Prevention Efforts
What is most troubling about black lung is that it is 
preventable.5 Many interviewees, particularly gov-
ernment officials within the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the 
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) claim 
that if dust protocols were followed, black lung would 
not exist. This interviewee, a pulmonologist, states: 
I always say, it’s not rocket science; you get black 
lung disease from breathing too much coal dust. It’s 
very simple. We know what causes it, we know how 
to prevent it, we know that the measures that are in 
place in law can prevent the majority of [black lung] 
disease that’s out there. And the frustration for me is 
the fact that that is not upheld.6
Noncompliance With 
Dust Regulations and 
Falsified Dust Sampling
Noncompliance with dust regula-
tions is a notable concern among 
Appalachian miners. Regulators, 
other government employees, and 
miners who were interviewed note 
that negligent dust practices and 
fraudulent dust sampling have 
become commonplace in many 
Appalachian mines, yet coal opera-
tors report “compliant” numbers. 
As one regulator notes: 
Cheating on the dust sampling, 
that still goes on all the time....
The old system.…is basically 
this dust pump that just mea-
sures how much dust is col-
lected into it.…There’s nothing 
in the apparatus that can say 
where it’s been during this time. 
And what would typically hap-
pen, and a million guys tell me 
this sort of thing, you would 
wrap it [dust monitor] in rags. 
You would put it in a dinner 
bucket. You would go hang it in 
the fresh air intake, where noth-
ing but clean air is blowing over 
it the whole time.7
Hiding evidence from inspec-
tors and falsifying dust samples 
has become so routinized in the 
mines, interviewees say, that miners 
are instructed to change practices 
when inspectors are present: “Their 
[the coal operators] main reason 
is to make money and run coal. If 
inspectors come, more is done to 
cover the dust.” Many miners report 
that ventilation curtains were only 
hung when inspectors were pres-
ent. Since underground mines are 
typically inspected four times a year, 
this assertion implies that mines are 
likely operating incorrectly 361 days 
a year. Most research participants 
argue that many coal operators do 
not follow dust regulations because 
it costs too much money, and that 
this “outlaw operator” phenomenon 
is unique to central Appalachia: 
“You just have more outlaw 
operators here. You just do. More 
scofflaw.”8 But it is the experience of 
interviewees that Appalachian coal 
companies continue to deny culpa-
bility and routinely externalize the 
cost of black lung: 
I was shocked when this 
person in the coal industry 
told me, ‘It’s just not relevant 
to us because we don’t pay for 
it’…in other words, there’s not 
a human value there at all. 
There’s nothing—that there 
are people who are dying and 
are having a miserable life 
gasping for breath, and that’s 
not a relevant concern.9
Poor Training and 
Understanding of 
Chronic Dust Exposure
Despite evidence that black lung is 
preventable, central Appalachia is 
in the midst of the largest spike in 
prevalence in over 30 years. Many 
miners believe that black lung is 
inevitable: “There ain’t no way of 
preventing it. They make respi-
rators. Some do and some don’t 
[wear them]. I don’t see any way 
of avoiding black lung.” The twin 
perceptions that black lung is not 
preventable and that a miner is 
personally to blame for not using a 
respirator are common among coal 
workers. However, respirators have 
been shown to be an unreliable line 
of defense,10 and quality problems 
plague their users: in 2018, 3M 
paid $67.5 million to Kentucky 
miners who used faulty respira-
tors in coal mining operations.11 
Miners continue to believe that 
respirators are approved mecha-
nisms of defense, but dust preven-
tion requires mechanical controls 
such as water sprays, scrubbers, 
and ventilation systems.12 These 
misconceptions point to deficient 
miner safety and health training. 
Black Lung Screening
Mines are required to arrange 
opportunities for annual black 
lung screenings, free of charge, 
but few miners take advantage 
of them. According to a govern-
ment official, “They get a free test 
every year from the Department 
of Labor.…They can do it every 
year for the rest of their lives.” Yet 
interviews suggest that many min-
ers remain fearful of losing their 
jobs if they get tested for black 
lung, even though NIOSH assures 
that screening is confidential. One 
research participant said that min-
ers “are afraid…because if the coal 
company finds out that they are 
going to a black lung clinic, or that 
they are having chest x-rays done, 
they’re going to fire them and get 
somebody else in to work.” In this 
sense, proactive miners who wish 
to be tested for black lung are 
equivalent to whistleblowers in 
the company’s eyes, thus creating 
a vulnerable situation for them-
selves and their communities. 
Regions with stagnant economies 
are even more defenseless. Some 
researchers argue that this culture 
of fear resonates among miners 
due to precarious coal employ-
ment in Appalachia.13 
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FIGURE 1. PERCENTAGE OF ACTIVE, UNDERGROUND, LONG-TENURE (25-PLUS 
YEARS) COAL MINERS WITH BLACK LUNG IN KENTUCKY, VIRGINIA, AND WEST 
VIRGINIA COMPARED TO THE REST OF THE UNITED STATES, 1974–2017
Note: Data include only active miners who voluntarily participated in black lung screening. 
Source: NIOSH Coal Workers Health Surveillance Program Data Query System, 2020  
(https://webappa.cdc.gov/ords/cwhsp-database.html)
Figure 1 uses data from 
NIOSH’s Coal Workers’ Health 
Surveillance Program (CWHSP) 
to show the continued concen-
tration of black lung in central 
Appalachia (the region situated 
in Kentucky, Virginia, and West 
Virginia) compared to the rest of 
the United States. Although the 
CWHSP is immensely helpful for 
tracking black lung prevalence, its 
estimates capture only active and 
voluntary miners who have been 
tested; many retired and untested 
active miners are not represented 
in its data. Annual mandatory 
testing of all miners would limit 
the unfavorable bias toward proac-
tive miners and allow the collec-
tion of accurate black lung data.
MSHA has sanctioned some 
health and safety improvements in 
recent years. For instance, MSHA 
recently decreased the respirable 
dust limit from 2 mg/m3 to 1.5 mg/
m3 after the previous limit was 
found to be ineffective. MSHA 
also implemented the use of 
continuous personal dust moni-
tors to cut down on dust fraud 
and improve real-time reporting.14 
The outcomes of these changes are 
unknown at this time; indeed, the 
lag effect of black lung could leave 
us uninformed for years to come. 
While these changes are impor-
tant, they are inadequate without 
industry buy-in and government 
enforcement. 
FIGURE 2. TOTAL MINERS TESTED AND PERCENTAGE OF MINERS WITH 
BLACK LUNG IN WEST VIRGINIA, 1970–2014




While the deficiencies of black 
lung prevention are many, black 
lung compensation is equally 
problematic. In West Virginia at 
least, miners are developing black 
lung at unprecedented rates, even 
though fewer are tested (see Figure 
2). Given the progressive nature of 
black lung even after dust exposure 
stops, this upward trend is alarming. 
And though coal employment is at 
a historic low, production trends 
have recently increased after a long 
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downward spiral (see Figure 3). This 
trend could imply that miners are 
being overexposed to coal dust as 
fewer employees work longer hours 
to make up for a reduced workforce. 
Moreover, many coal companies 
have filed for bankruptcy, putting 
miners’ health care, pensions, and 
black lung benefits at risk. 
Black lung benefits consist of a 
monthly payment of $669.30 and a 
medical card for single filers. Only 
18.02 percent of filed black lung 
claims were awarded in 2017,15 and 
the average time it took for miners 
in this study to acquire their benefits 
was six years, with a range from one 
year to two decades. Yet despite the 
low disbursement rates and rising 
prevalence, the coal industry contin-
ues to demand lower tax rates. Even 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the National Mining Association 
has promoted a 50 percent cut to the 
$1.10/ton excise tax for underground 
coal and $0.55 tax for surface coal 
that are used to fund the Black Lung 
Benefits Trust Fund.16 The fund has 
nearly always operated at a deficit, 
and decreasing the coal excise tax 
would ultimately shift the financial 
burden of black lung benefits from 
coal operators to taxpayers. 
Black lung is not only a public 
health disaster,17 it is also a social 
justice issue. Receiving compensa-
tion for black lung is rooted in an 
adversarial process: miners must 
prove their work history and total 
disability from black lung before 
they have a “legitimate” case. These 
legal battles between miners and 
goliath coal company legal teams 
are often insurmountable for min-
ers, given their limited resources 
and time, and even after being 
awarded benefits many miners fear 
losing them due to the precarious 
nature of the industry. 
Issues such as skirting regulations, 
falsifying records, and putting work-
ers at risk are not isolated events or 
unique to the coal mining industry. 
Many workers across the industrial 
spectrum experience similar precari-
ous work environments in which 
profit is prioritized over human 
health and safety. Shortcuts to safety 
and health create only short-term 
gains, while the accumulated long-
term cost and risk are much greater. 
We must provide safe work environ-
ments for all employees, as intended 
by the Department of Labor. 
Opportunities for Policy 
and Practice
• Industry buy-in and government 
enforcement of mine safety regu-
lations are essential. The coal 
industry must follow dust proto-
cols and implement appropriate 
mechanical dust controls. Coal 
companies must be held respon-
sible by government agencies for 
failing to prevent black lung. 
• Coal companies should receive 
briefings on NIOSH data trends, 
up-to-date research findings, 
and best practices in the 
workplace, and participate in 
the National Coalition of Black 
Lung and Respiratory Disease 
Clinics annual conference.
• Miners should receive updated 
and improved annual MSHA 
miner safety training and a 
confidential, secure means of 
reporting safety violations.
• More frequent MSHA check-
ins and inspections should be 
instituted to enhance compliance 
with health and safety standards.
• Mandatory annual black lung 
screenings should be instituted 
in order to eliminate the stigma 
felt by proactive coal workers. 
• The adversarial nature of black 
lung compensation claims 
should be reformed, and a slid-
ing scale of benefits should be 
created for miners with a black 
lung diagnosis. 
• The coal excise tax should be 
increased by $0.25/ton to elimi-
nate the Black Lung Benefits 
Trust Fund debt and secure the 
fund for future claimants.18 
FIGURE 3. WEST VIRGINIA COAL PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT, 1900–2018
Source: West Virginia Coal Association, “Coal Facts 2019,” 2019  
(https://www.wvcoal.com/resources/coal-facts/5176-coal-facts-2019)
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Data and Methods
This research is based on four 
years of triangulated qualitative 
and quantitative data. Primary 
data were accumulated through 
in-depth interviews starting in 
2015 with 25 key informants 
including miners, black lung clinic 
workers, black lung attorneys, 
government employees, and lay 
advocates. A second wave of data 
collection commenced in 2019 
with a case-study analysis of two 
black lung clinics in southwest 
Virginia. Twenty-four additional 
interviews with miners and clinic 
workers were collected during 
this time, for a total of 59 inter-
views. Quantitative data for coal 
production and employment are 
reported by the West Virginia Coal 
Association in its annual Coal 
Facts publication.19 Prevalence data 
for central Appalachia are col-
lected by the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health 
through the Coal Workers’ Health 
Surveillance Program.20 These data 
are aggregated at the county level 
and reported in five-year intervals. 
Additional data were gathered 
through participant observation, 
document analysis, and news 
articles. Participant observation 
took place in 2015, 2016, and 2018 
at the national and regional black 
lung conferences supported by the 
National Coalition of Black Lung 
and Respiratory Disease Clinics. 
To triangulate and extend the 
analysis, I also incorporated docu-
ment analysis from government 
agencies including NIOSH, the 
MSHA, and the Division of Coal 
Mine Workers’ Compensation; the 
United Mine Workers of America; 
and news articles. 
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